A (Radical) Femininomenon: Why Women Join Sexist Islamist Extremist Groups
Kyla Prussman
Introduction:
Radicalization is a type of political engagement, but it ignores and disrespects democratic norms. If we can better understand these processes, it will help us combat the negative tendencies and move towards more positive civic engagement. The conversation surrounding Islamist extremist groups, such as ISIS, tends to mainly focus on male members' radicalization, motivations, roles, and experiences. It’s becoming increasingly pertinent to study women’s involvement in Islamist extremist groups because women are increasingly being used tactically in these groups (Gan, Neo, Chin, and Khader 2019, 205). If the conversation ignores women's radicalization, motivations, and experiences it can be harmful to understanding their true role within these male dominated organizations. Islamist extremist groups, such as ISIS, are known to be violent against women and have outwardly sexist rules. My research asks the question, why do women join Islamist extremist groups when they are known to be sexist and violent towards women in the surrounding communities, as well as towards their own female members? I also investigate the relationship between the media surrounding radical Islamist women and the alienation of women as a whole. I analyze the claim that women whose lives are affected by processes of alienation, such as sexism, domestic violence, and for Muslim women, Islamophobia, are more likely to be radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. Lastly, I hypothesize that out of the three process of alienation I’ve identified, alienation due to sexism will be the process with the strongest influence on women becoming radicalized to Islamist extremist groups.
Literature Review:
While women have been a part of Islamist extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) for many years, the literature on their involvement in such groups is fairly new. It is important to pinpoint and understand their involvement in these groups because women are increasingly being used tactically and holding actual positions in the organizations (Gan, Neo, Chin, and Khader 2019, 205-206). Much of the literature generalizes the roles of women in these organizations to either terrorist or victim, but in reality, their role tends to be more complex and multifaceted (Charrad 2011, 418). Since their role in these groups is constantly changing, researchers have begun to try and better understand the reasons why these women are joining these organizations in the first place. By having a better understanding on why these women are joining Islamist extremist groups, it will be easier to navigate the constantly changing political landscape and uncovering the true role of women in said groups.
When a person joins an Islamist extremist organization, the motivations and reasons are going to differ by gender. Yet, in most literature about members of Islamist extremist groups and their motivations for joining, these differences are not reflected. Some authors argue that this is a problem when trying to understand the role of women in these organizations (Charrad 2011, 428). The reasons that women join these organizations cannot be summed up to one single thing. If women's motivations are assumed to be the same as men’s motivations or not even thought about, the role of women in these groups remains hidden and unclear. Understanding the reasons why women join these groups is not only important in identifying their role, but also the inner workings of the groups themselves (Speckhard and Ellenburg 2020, 82). The motivations for both men and women differ by region as well as gender. Men's motivations usually have more to do with employment, while “the women were more focused on fulfilling basic needs, along with personal and familial safety” (Speckhard and Ellenburg 2020, 101). A “solidification” of one's Islamic identity and Islamist ideology is also present in both men and women's motivations (Speckhard and Ellenburg 2020, 101). While they do share a common motivation, they also have different personal motivations. Despite it being a small difference, it shows the importance of not clumping female motivations with male motivations because they aren't all the same.
Looking at the circumstance that these women are in is an important step into uncovering their motivations for joining these Islamist extremist groups. Women have feelings of alienation that are caused by inequality, racism, lack of religious freedom, xenophobia that are ultimately targeted by ISIS recruiters (Perešin 2015, 24). The West and Western thought process are massive contributors to those feelings of alienation that these women face. Alienation, in a psychological sense, is widely recognized as ‘taking away’, ‘remove’, or ‘cause a separation to occur’ (Sarfraz 1997, 45). There is an interesting relationship between alienation and the need to search for a sense of belonging. (Sageman 2008, 6). Much of the literature surrounding terrorism doesn't exactly define what alienation looks like in radicalized individuals, instead it is just widely considered as a “push factor” that can influence radicalization (Gan, Neo, Chin, and Khader 2019, 212). On top of that, how alienation presents in women involved in terrorism and what causes alienation in women is very un-defined, which is what my research hopes to better understand. Radicalization and extremism, in the case of Muslim women, can be reactionary to the rising “antipathy” towards Muslims and Islam (Pratt 2015, 215-216). When the West thinks of Muslims, unfortunately due to the years of building hatred, see only fear (Rafiq and Khan 2021, 41). On the contrary, when the West thinks of a woman in an Islamist extremist group or a Muslim woman in the Middle East in general, they only see victims (Sjoberg 2018, 299). This belief also morphed into the idea that Muslim women need to be “saved” (Skalli 2015, 175). This belief is inherently sexist as the West just views women and Muslim women in these Islamist extremist groups and the Middle East in general as just “pawns” of men with no real agency (Bloom 2011, 233). This idea acts as a cause of alienation that women who are radicalized to Islamist extremist group may face. In turn, this makes women more vulnerable to ISIS recruiters because they have the desire to not only gain respect in their surroundings, but also a sense of control (Kneip 2016, 99).
There is still some evidence that women might be vulnerable to radicalization if they also experience domestic violence. Alienation in women can also be caused by domestic violence. Women can lose their sense of self and therefore their own personal agency as a victim of domestic violence (Neale 2023, 283). Domestic violence is not just defined by physical abuse, but also emotional abuse. Verbal assault, dominance, control, isolation, ridicule, or the use of intimate knowledge for degradation all count as emotional abuse (Karakurt and Silver 2013, 1). The loss of self, experienced in instances of domestic violence, makes these women vulnerable to being radicalized.
Many onlookers share the opinion that Islamic extremist groups are incredibly misogynistic. This isn't necessarily wrong, groups such as ISIS are misogynistic, but that doesn't mean that all women are passive (Lia 2017, 466). ISIS did not just aspire to be a terrorist organization, but in fact wanted to be full-fledged state, to do this they needed women (Perešin 2018, 36). While women do primarily act in terms of wife and mother in Islamist extremist groups, there has been a notable shift in more and more women preforming “member duties” (Lia 2017, 464). In fact, one author states that most women now act as recruiters for ISIS compared to acting as a mother/wife (Spencer 2016, 92). Despite this switch, people are often still surprised that women are a part of these organizations. Women can carry out attacks and be perpetrators of force while also being a wife and mother (Gul 2018, 85). One author argues that men are expected to be “naturally more violent than women'', and if a woman is violent, it’s unnatural (Auchter 2012, 125). The idea that women are nonviolent is permanently fixed in much of society’s perception of women and terrorism (Bloom 2011, 233). Another author argues that the more women are downplayed as terrorists the more their tactical worth increases to the organization (Sjoberg 2009, 70-71). That’s why many terrorist organizations use women as suicide bombers because of the level of psychological harm it can cause to see a women involved in something so violent (Speckhard 2008, 1029). Terrorist organizations utilize women suicide bombers over men because to the organization women are expendable (Speckhard 2008, 1032).
Islamophobia can also be a huge cause of alienation that these women are facing, specifically Muslim women. One author argues that Muslim women also lose their sense of self and personal agency because they believe they’re viewed only in terms of their Muslim identity, not their own being (Welborne et al. 2018, 76). The West seems to pick and choose when it weaponizes a Muslim women's identity against them. On one hand, its incomprehensible that a woman would leave her original life to join and Islamist extremist group. On the other, the common term in Western media when depicting a woman who joined an Islamist extremist group is ‘Jihadi Bride.’ The term further perpetuates the infatuation the West has with radicalized women (Jackson 2022, 7). When the media uses the term ‘Jihadi bride’ or ‘ISIS bride’ they depict the women as both victimized and sexualized, but also dangerous (Nyamutata 2020, 774). This creates a unique problem where the main perception of women is that they are incapable of violence, but the commonly used term to describe radicalized women envokes fear about these women. The term is commonly used for any women associated with Islamist extremist groups, despite marital status. Including bride in the term further genders women apart of such groups, moving the conversation away from terrorism (Nyamutata 2020, 774).
While the literature acknowledges that Islamist extremist groups are violent towards women and that women themselves can be violent within these groups, it doesn't explain why women are joining despite knowing how violent and sexist these groups are. It is hard to ignore the types of videos and propaganda puts out that outwardly and proudly show that Islamist extremist groups, like ISIS, have very sexist and violent tendencies towards women. Yet, women still join these groups. If this gap in literature could be addressed, the roles and motivations of women in these groups could be understood better.
While there are still some questions about why women are joining these groups, the current literature provides enough information to understand some of their motivations. And when women's motivations are better understood, their role within these Islamist extremist organizations becomes clearer. This provides an opportunity to have a better and more in-depth comprehension of Islamist extremist groups, not just through the eyes of their male members, but all their members. This ultimately could lead to better policies and processes that lessen the power and scope of these groups and the violence and harm they inflict.
Research Question and Hypothesis:
Why do young women join Islamist extremist groups when they are known to be sexist and violent towards women?
Hypothesis 1: By looking at the START dataset out of the University of Maryland I would expect that a woman who has been radicalized to an Islamist extremist group would be between 15 and 23 years old, have an education level of no high school, some high school, or a high school degree, be between 15 and 23 years old, married, experienced trauma sometime before radicalization, been abused at some point in their adulthood, a low class social stratum, and has a radical significant other of some sort. This is because I theorize that these characteristics are potential risk factors that cause the women to be more vulnerable to potential processes of alienation and alienation itself.
Hypothesis 2: I hypothesize that women whose lives are affected by processes of alienation, such as sexism, domestic violence, and for Muslim women, Islamophobia, are more likely to be radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. Women who are exposed to processes of alienation are more likely to join because they believe that joining will allow them to break out of the alienation they face in their current lives and find a sense of control.
Hypothesis 3: I hypothesize that my analysis will show that out of the three processes of alienation that I identified, alienation due to sexism, domestic violence, or Islamophobia, alienation due to sexism will be the process of alienation that is the most impactful in motivating and influencing young women to be radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. This is because alienation caused by sexism is something that all these women can face within their lives despite other processes of alienation, such as being in an abusive relationship or religious identity.
Data, Conceptualization, Method, and Operationalization:
My project has both quantitative and qualitative sections to try and show support for my claims. For the first part of my project, I used the START dataset on Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States to create a profile of women who are radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. The START dataset is part of the START project out of the University of Maryland; it aims to better understand the human causes and consequences of terrorism. The dataset is constantly updating and adding cases, for my research project I downloaded the dataset when there was a total of 394 women offenders who have been radicalized to an extremist organization within the United States and 46 women who have been radicalized to an Islamist extremist group. While there are more women that have been added since, I will be looking at the 46 women that were in the dataset when I initially downloaded the dataset. The dataset provides data on key background information, such as education levels, marital status, etc.
To test my hypothesis, I performed three cross tabs with the dependent variable as the type of extremist group the women were radicalized to: Islamist, Far Left, and Far Right. I analyzed seven categories for differences among those three groups: Age, Education, Marital Status, Trauma, Abuse as an Adult, Social Stratum in Adulthood, and Radical Significant Other. For each of the seven categories I first analyzed how they affected women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. I would expect to see that a woman who has been radicalized to an Islamist extremist group to have less than a high school degree, be radicalized young (between 15 and 23 years old), married, experienced abuse and trauma sometime before their radicalization, lower class, and to have a radical significant other. By creating a profile of Islamist radicalized women and comparing that to what a woman who has been radicalized to Far Left and Far Right extremist groups looks like, I identified if there are any specific characteristics in the Islamist radicalization group. These characteristics serve as potential risk factors that may cause women to be more vulnerable to possible alienation.
For the second part of my project, I found six interviews with women who are ex-Islamist extremist organization members: Hoda Mutana, Shukee Begum, Tareena Shakil, Shamima Begum, Tania Georgelas, and Sam Sally (Sam Elhassani). They are all western women who fled their homes, travelled to Syria, and were members of the Islamic State for a period of time. Three of the women are still in Syria living in refugee camps, where if they gain approval to return to their country of origin, will face jail time for their involvement with a terrorist organization. One woman is currently serving a six-year jail sentence, and another served six years all ready. One woman currently serves as an advocate for the de-radicalization process as she tries to gain her U.S. citizenship.
I created clear transcripts of the video interviews, but many of them already had transcripts available. I then analyzed the transcripts looking for mentions of alienation due to sexism, alienation due to domestic violence, and alienation due to islamophobia. I performed an in-depth qualitative analysis. It was an exercise in theory building and less about showing a causal relationship between my variables. To start, I went through each interview transcript and marked if/when they mention or describe alienation or a process of alienation. I did this by using my coding that I created. I’ve coded alienation due to sexism to present as the women changing themselves to try and fit more traditional gender roles, feeling like their only role is to serve and please men, having low self-confidence, and having feelings of anger and hopelessness towards the patriarchal society they perceive themselves to be living in. I’ve coded alienation due to domestic violence to present as becoming isolated from friends and family due to their partner, a lack of privacy due to their partner, a lack of sense of self, and low confidence. I’ve coded alienation due to Islamophobia to present as fear to present as Muslim out of fear of hate crimes (wearing a Hijab, Niqab, Burqa, etc.), a lack of sense of self due to society only viewing them as Muslim, anger towards Western society because of their fear and hate towards Muslims, and feelings of not wanting to be a part of Western society because of how they view Muslims. I also gathered news headlines referring to all six of the women in the interviews. I analyzed the six headlines and paid close attention to similarities in their language and my identified processes of alienation.
Once I went through all the interviews and noted whether they mentioned or described a process of alienation or not, I went through my findings and separated them into my three categories of processes of alienation. After, I went through and identified how many of each process of alienation were mentioned in each interview. I used my own judgment on how significant the processes are to each of the women by looking at when and how the women talk about the processes of alienation. I then compared the women’s results to each other. My hypothesis is relative and with the limited number of interviews that I have, I had to deem my hypotheses supported/not supported on a preliminary basis. My analysis on the significance of the processes of alienation according to each of the individual women in the interviews helped me form a better code on how to deem my hypotheses supported/not supported.
Limitations of the Study:
This study has potential limitations. The START dataset on Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States only has data on women who were successfully radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. There is no data within the dataset on women who weren't successfully radicalized to Islamist extremist groups, so there is no comparison group of similar non-radicalized women from which to draw more causal inferences. Another potential limitation is the validity and truthfulness of the statements from the women in the interviews on their past actions and thoughts. Many of these women have had their citizenship taken away because they joined an Islamist extremist group. This raises the question of whether what they’re saying is true or if they are lying in order to gain support and sympathy to try and regain their citizenship. I also have a limited number of interviews, which makes it hard to make general assumptions about women in Islamist extremist groups because I have such a limited sample size.
Data Analysis: Results and Findings
Before analyzing the data in the START dataset on Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States, I hypothesized that women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups would be between 15 and 23 years old, have a high school degree or less, married, experienced abuse sometime before radicalization, belong to a low class social stratum, been abused at some point in their adulthood, and have a radical significant. These characteristics serve as potential risk factors that can make women more susceptible to experiencing processes of alienation, which can result in alienation in general. Women who are younger, less educated, have a low-class social stratum, experienced trauma, and been abused as an adult may not have as many resources to combat feelings and processes of alienation. On top of that, women who are married and have a radical significant other may not have the agency or ability to fight off alienation.
How well do radicalized Islamist women fit that profile? The average age of a woman who has been radicalized to an Islamist extremist group in the sample is 30 years old, as shown in Table 1. Therefore, my hypothesis that women radicalized to an Islamist extremist group will be between 15 and 23 years old, is not supported. While the age is higher than I originally hypothesized, this could be attributed to the dataset coding the age to be at the time of the incident or arrest that has qualified them to be considered radicalized. This age is not the age that their radicalization process started, i.e. talking to recruiters, shown extremist material, introduced to extremist ideas, etc. If 30 is the age where these women's radicalization hits a climax, it makes sense to assume that these women would have been between 15 and 23 years old when their initial radicalization process began.
Originally, I argued that the average age of women radicalized to non-Islamist extremist groups in the sample will be significantly higher than the women radicalized to an Islamist extremist group in the sample. Table 1 shows that the average age of the other women radicalized to non-Islamist extremist groups in the dataset is 29. There is barely a difference between the average age of women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups in the sample and women radicalized to non-Islamist extremist groups in the sample. This shows that age might not be a characteristic with much impact on a woman’s radicalization process.
Looking at the education levels of women radicalized to an Islamist extremist group in Table 2, the column labeled ‘Islamist’ shows that 30.4% of women radicalized to an Islamist extremist group in the sample have some college, a college degree, some vocational school, or a vocational school degree. While only 21.7% of radical Islamist women in the sample have no high school, some high school, or a high school degree. Also, 41.3% of the women radicalized to an Islamist extremist group have an unknown level of education. Therefore, my hypothesis that women radicalized to an Islamist extremist group would have no high school, some high school, or a high school degree, is not supported. This could be because the average age of women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups in the sample is 30 years old. Meaning, these women have more time to have college or vocational school experience and/or a degree.
The column in Table 2 labeled ‘non-Islamist’ shows that only 9.8% of women radicalized to non-Islamist extremist groups in the sample have a high school degree or less. This is considerably smaller than 21.7% of radical Islamist women in the sample with the same education level. And 32.5% of radical non-Islamist women in the sample have some college, a college degree, some vocational school, or a vocational school degree. This is a bit higher than 30.4% of radical Islamist women in the sample that have the same education level. This shows that while radical Islamist women in the sample are slightly less educated compared to the radical non-Islamist women in the sample, the women in the sample are mainly similar in terms of education level. The relationship between the two is not significantly significant because the p value is >0.5. Therefore, my hypothesis is not supported.
Moving on to the marital status of women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups in the sample, the column labeled ‘Islamist’ in Table 3 shows that 43.5% of radical Islamist women in the sample are married. Therefore, my hypothesis that women radicalized to Islamist extremist group will be married is supported. It is interesting to note that 26.1% of women radicalized to an Islamist extremist group are single. This could be due to the sample consisting of only Western women where the pressure to get married might not be as strong as the pressure non-Western women are facing to get married.
Are radical Islamist women more likely to be married than radical non-Islamist women? The column labeled ‘non-Islamist’ in Table 3 shows that only 28.2% of women radicalized to non-Islamist extremist groups in the sample are married. This is lower than the 43.5% of women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups in the sample. The relationship is statistically significant because the p value is <0.5. Therefore, radical Islamist women are 15.3% more likely to be married than radical non-Islamist women, supporting my hypothesis. Radical Islamist women are also 8.6% more likely to be divorced/separated. However, the radical non-Islamist women in the sample are more likely to have a marital status that is unclear.
Are women who are radicalized to Islamist extremist groups more likely to be lower class? The column labeled ‘Islamist’ in Table 4 shows that 47.8% of women radicalized to an Islamist extremist group in the sample have a middle-class social stratum in their adulthood. When I use social stratum, I’m referring to social class and an adult middle-class social stratum means that they don’t receive welfare, live in lower-middle or middle-class neighborhood, have steady professional employment, owns, or holds a mortgage on a house, has a college degree. This is larger than the 19.6% of radical Islamist women in the sample that have a low-class social stratum in their adulthood. Adult low-class social stratum means that they receive welfare, live close to the poverty line, are regularly unemployed or at best work a blue-collar job, live in subsidized housing. Therefore, my hypothesis that women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups in the sample will have a low-class social stratum, is not supported. This makes sense because the education level of radical Islamist women in the sample was schooling beyond high school and the middle-class social stratum included having a college degree. The high percent of women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups that have a middle-class social stratum in their adulthood could also be affected by the women's spouse because 43.5% of radical Islamist women in the sample are married.
Even though radical Islamist women are more likely to be middle class, are radical Islamist women more likely to be lower class in comparison to radical non-Islamist women? The column labeled ‘non-Islamist’ in Table 4 shows that only 12.1% of radical non-Islamist women in the sample were lower class compared to the 19.6% of radical Islamist women in the sample that were lower class. However, there is far more missing data for radical non-Islamist women. It’s interesting that both radical Islamist and non-Islamist women were most likely to be middle class because common stereotypes about radical women paints them as not having access to resources. This seems not to be the case for the women in this sample, which can be seen reflected in the lack of statistical significance between the differences. It also makes sense with the previous findings that radical Islamist women are on average older and more educated than previously expected.
Transitioning to looking at abuse and trauma levels, the column labeled ‘Islamist’ in Table 5 shows that only 10.8% of radical Islamist women in the sample have been abused at some point in their adulthood and 89.1% of radical Islamist women have not been abused in their adulthood. The dataset codes abuse as abuse by non-family members, family members, or both. At first glance, this data is saying that radical Islamist women are more likely to not have been abused in their adulthood. However, I think it is important to note that the validity of both yes and no answers could be skewed. Women who answered yes may have done so in hopes to gain sympathy for their actions. Women who answered no may have done so out of fear or shame. It’s interesting that there is no unknown data regarding abuse levels, just yes or no. This makes me think that the validity of these answers should be taken into consideration when analyzing this characteristic.
Is abuse a defining characteristic of radical Islamist women even though only 10.8% of radical Islamist women in the sample have been abused at some point in their adulthood? The column labeled ‘non-Islamist’ in Table 5 shows only 3.7% of radical non-Islamist women in the sample have been abused at some point in their adulthood. This is lower than the 10.8% of radical Islamist women in the sample that have experienced abuse at some point in their adulthood. Therefore, radical Islamist women are 7.1% more likely to have experienced abuse in their adulthood compared to radical non-Islamist women. The differences between radical Islamist and non-Islamist women can be seen to be statistically significant.
Moving on to trauma, the column labeled ‘Islamist’ in Table 5 shows that 30.5% of radical Islamist women in the sample experienced trauma at some point before their radicalization. However, 30.4% of radical Islamist women in the sample did not experience trauma before their radicalization and 39.1% of radical Islamist women have an unknown level of trauma. Trauma is coded to present as the individual experiencing or witnessing a traumatic event that caused intense fear, helplessness, and fear. These results show how trauma is an interesting characteristic to analyze because it is unknown how truthful both the yes and the no responses are. On one hand, the women who answer no to having experienced trauma before their radicalization, may being doing so out of fear. And on the other hand, the women who answer yes to having experienced trauma before their radicalization, could be trying to gain sympathy and support to explain their actions in these groups. Despite there only being a .01% difference between radical Islamist women that experienced trauma and those who didn't, essentially 1/3 of radical Islamist women experienced trauma before their radicalization. This shows how wide the range of experiences is for radical Islamist women and reiterates how little we truly understand about women's experiences with trauma. The lack of more concrete evidence leads me to deem support for my hypothesis inconclusive.
How much more likely are radical Islamist women to experience trauma before their radicalization compared to radical non-Islamist women? The column labeled ‘non-Islamist’ in Table 5 shows that only 13.4% of radical non-Islamist women in the sample experienced trauma at some point before their radicalization compared to the 30.5% of radical Islamist women in the sample. Therefore, radical Islamist women are 17.1% more likely to experience trauma before their radicalization compared to radical non-Islamist women. Similar to previous findings, radical non-Islamist women have far less data regarding their trauma level. However, the differences between radical Islamist and non-Islamist women can be seen to be statistically significant.
The last risk factor for alienation I will be looking at is the presence of a radical significant other. The column labeled ‘Islamist’ in Table 6 shows that 47.9% of radical Islamist women in the sample have a radical significant other, regardless of the significant other’s level of radicalization. This is slightly higher than the 41.3% of radical Islamist women that don't have a radical significant other and much higher than the 10.9 % of radical Islamist women that its unknown if they have a radical significant other. The 47.9% of radical Islamist women that have a radical significant other fits with the previous finding that 43.5% of radical Islamist women in the sample are married. It is interesting that 41.3% of radical Islamist women in the sample did not have a radical significant other. This may be because 26.1% of radical Islamist women in the sample are single and 26.1% of radical Islamist women in the sample are divorced/separated or widowed. The higher percent of radical Islamist women in the sample with no radical significant other also may be attributed to the women in this sample being Western women who might not be around a large group of radicalized persons.
Are radical Islamist women more or less likely to have a radical significant other compared to radical non-Islamist women? The column labeled ‘non-Islamist’ in Table 6 shows that only 27.9% of radical non-Islamist women in the sample have a radical significant other. This is notably lower than the 47.9% of radical Islamist women in the sample that have a radical significant other. Therefore, radical Islamist women are 20% more likely to have a radical significant other compared to radical non-Islamist women. However, similar to previous findings, there is less data surrounding radical non-Islamist women. The 20% difference is in fact statistically significant.
Originally, I hypothesized that women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups would be younger, less educated, married, experienced trauma, abused in their adulthood, lower class, and have a radical significant other. This is because I identified these seven characteristics as risk factors that could cause women to be more susceptible to alienation. After my analysis, several of my risk factors have changed to create a more well-rounded profile. Women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups will have the risk factors of an age around 30 years old at the point of climax in their radicalization, have a college or vocational school degree or less, married, may have experienced trauma or abuse at some point before their radicalization, middle class, and have a radical significant other. What does this mean in terms of alienation? Well, it seems as though a women's age, education level, and social stratum have less of a relationship with alienation. Whereas it seems marital status, a radical significant other, and experiencing trauma or abuse at some point before radicalization might be a potential source of alienation. As I transition to look at actual mentions of alienation from radical Islamist women I will keep these risk factors in mind, especially the factors that have the potential to be sources of alienation.
When I say ‘alienation due to’ I am stating that the alienation at hand was caused by certain experiences. For example, when I refer to alienation due to sexism, I mean that the alienation the women is facing is because of sexist experiences or encounters. While there are some mentions of alienation due to sexism, not all the women mention it and for those who do it is hard to say how impactful it was on their radicalization process To begin my analysis on alienation due to sexism, I will first look at Tania Georgelas. At 30 years old Tania Georgelas left the U.S. and fled to Syria with her then husband after years of radicalization through her strict Muslim friends and the effects of 9/11.
When asked about her upbringing, Tania Georgelas states that,
“I did see a lot of abuse when it came to how men treated women in our community. It was pretty disgusting, and I said from a young age that I was just going to escape it. It's always the woman's fault whenever the man wants to beat up the woman, the woman deserved it.”
Georgelas also says that “I felt like Islam was going to be a solution for all of these problems, societal problems and cultural problems.” In this interview, Georgelas describes feelings of anger towards a patriarchal society and wanting to “escape” it. This matches my coding for alienation due to sexism where I identify having feelings of anger and hopelessness towards the patriarchal society they perceive themselves to be living in. Georgelas also states that she thought that Islam would solve these problems, and this is why she became more practicing.
33-year-old Shukee Begum took her five kids, all under the age of 12, left the UK, and travelled to Syria in search for her husband who joined ISIS. Alienation due to sexism in Shukee Begum’s case is not as clear compared to Tania Georgelas. She doesn't come out and mention sexism as a motivator in going to Syria and becoming a member of ISIS. In fact, she says that she didn't go to Syria to join ISIS at all. Shukee Begum says that she travelled to Syria with her young children to get her husband back who had joined ISIS. When Shukee Begum was asked about her husband leaving to join ISIS, she said, “He's my husband and all of a sudden, he's not there anymore. So, it didn't feel like home anymore. I was trying to manage school runs and things like that. I was thinking about the children's future.” Begum answers why she brought her children with her to Syria by stating that, “He's a family man, and for me to take the children to see him, and then come away from there that would have been more powerful than anything else I had to say to him at the time.” Begum truly believed that bringing her kids to Syria was going to convince her husband to return home. Unfortunately, quite the opposite happened. Not only did Begum’s husband refuse to come home, but he also made it nearly impossible for her and her children to leave either. Shukee Begum’s answers about why she went to Syria and joined ISIS shows an extreme lack of self-confidence and low self-esteem. Low self-esteem can often be caused by emotional abuse/manipulation (Karakurt and Silver 2013, 2). While this is not specific or concrete enough to count as alienation due to sexism, she shows a very strong dependence on her husband that seems to be showing her involvement and belief in a patriarchal society. If she is being truthful about joining ISIS solely to get her husband to come home, she experienced some type of alienation related to sexism but not how I've identified it. This may be because she doesn't consciously know she is facing some type of alienation due to sexism, so she doesn't know how to pinpoint what she was feeling at that time. Or it may be unclear because she is not being entirely truthful about her involvement and motivations in ISIS. While I did find mentions of alienation due to sexism, they were only from two out of six of the women. It’s still unclear how much alienation due to sexism influences women to join Islamist extremist groups. Therefore, my claim that women whose lives are affected by alienation due to sexism are more likely to join Islamist extremist groups is not supported.
Similar to the results of trauma and abuse as an adult as risk factors, alienation due to domestic violence proved harder to identify within the interviews because it's a subject that most victims won't speak outright or loosely about out of fear and/or shame (National Domestic Violence Hotline 2023). The mentions of alienation due to domestic violence range from the women stating domestic violence by name as a reason for their radicalization to some women mentioning subsets of domestic violence, like emotional manipulation.
At 25 years old, Tareena Shakil left the UK, flew to Syria with her son and joined ISIS. In two separate interviews, Tareena Shakil talks about her experience with domestic violence. In one interview Shakil states, “I was living in a great country like England, and had a supportive family, but the life I was living at that time, in my marriage, a lot of domestic violence, really unhappy.” In another interview Shakil states, “So it was at a time when I was in a really unhappy place, due to a breakdown in relationship, and I was just generally feeling really lost, really due to the breakdown of the relationship.” This is interesting because the interview where she states domestic violence outright took place before the interview where she talks about her relationship in terms of “breaking down.” I would have expected that she would continue claiming domestic violence because it would help her gain support and sympathy from the public. This change in wording could be due to initial pressure from her legal team to maintain a certain image decreasing after she completed her prison sentence. Shakil also mentions that,
“I didn't feel like I had any direction in life, I just, I didn't know where life was going, because life, as I thought that it was going to be had been really taken away from me, and due to that, due to everything that was going on, I was, that left me feeling very vulnerable.”
Shakil also said that “...I was in a really vulnerable place. I felt very isolated from friends and family, and through the process of grooming I was kind of offered, a sense of belonging and a sense of a chance to start a new life…” After mentioning domestic violence by name, Shakil goes on to mention feelings that I've coded to present as alienation due to domestic violence. Shakil mentions feeling isolated from friends and family, a lack of sense of self, and wanting to feel a sense of belonging. In this case, it’s clear that the domestic violence she faced in her relationship caused her to become alienated from the rest of the world and she turned to ISIS as an escape from her life in hopes of starting a new one.
At 30 years old Sam Elhassani, her husband, and her two children moved out of the U.S., travelled to Syria to join ISIS. In the case of Elhassani, it’s unclear whether her radicalization and motivations for joining ISIS were because of alienation due to domestic violence versus a subset of domestic violence. While Elhassani never explicitly states examples of domestic violence within her relationship with her husband Moussa, she does hint towards emotional manipulation being involved at some points throughout their relationship and journey to ISIS. When asked about Moussa, Elhassani stated that, “He was really good at giving me attention, giving the kids attention, he was really good at it.” Elhassani goes on to say that “After a while he became bored, I think, with his life. One time, he took off for 3 days, I found out from people in the neighborhood he was on a cocaine binge.” She continues by stating that “So, my husband was like we're gonna get the money together for this (move the family to Morocco) and we get busy.” In this interview, domestic violence is not explicitly mentioned, but when she is recalling her side of the story of why she joined ISIS and her relationship with her husband, some of the things she says shows signs of emotional abuse, which is also domestic violence. The type of attention that Elhassani is describing is a sign of “love bombing“ (National Domestic Violence Hotline 2023). Love bombing is the act of overloading you with compliments, attention, and gifts and then using it to manipulate you in the future. Moussa used his acts of giving Elhassani and her children attention and providing for them to persuade Elhassani to go with him to Morocco.
Moussa also had the family sell all their belongings, including their home, and move to Morocco. This is an act of emotional manipulation even though Elhassani doesn't mention it by name. Elhassani goes on to explain that when they got to the border of Syria, Moussa took her daughter, all the cash they had, and crossed into Syria, Elhassani says, “And he just goes. He knows, he knows I'm gonna follow him, what am I going to do?” She knew she was going to follow him over the border because he took her daughter and all the money she had. Again, Elhassani is not explicitly talking about domestic violence by name, but she does show signs of experiencing emotional manipulation. The emotional manipulation that Elhassani was facing at the hands of her husband caused her not only to become alienated mentally, but also physically as he made his family move to Morrocco and then finally, Syria. I think in Sam Elhassani’s case, she faces alienation due to emotional manipulation rather than alienation due to domestic violence. Women who face emotional abuse and manipulation can often be lonelier and ’despairing’ compared to physically abused women (Karakurt and Silver 2013, 2). Emotional abuse and domestic violence in general can be seen to affect a victim's self-esteem (Karakurt and Silver 2013, 2). Low self-esteem can affect a woman's sense of self, making them more vulnerable to experiencing alienation of some kind.
While there is evidence of alienation due to domestic violence, I wouldn't say that women whose lives are affected by alienation due to domestic violence are more likely to join Islamist extremist groups because most women who experience domestic violence don't join radical groups. This poses an interesting research gap surrounding the relationship between domestic violence and women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. If their relationship is not cause and effect, then what is it?
Muslim women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups face a unique experience with alienation. Muslim women can and do face alienation due to sexism and alienation due to domestic violence. On top of those two processes of alienation, they also face a unique type of alienation that only Muslim’s can face, alienation due to Islamophobia. I say this is a unique type of alienation because in alienation due to sexism and alienation due to domestic violence, women affected experience sexism and domestic violence and in turn become alienated from society. Alienation due to Islamophobia can act in the same way, but it also can act where the women are already alienated due to their religious identity as a Muslim and the Islamophobia only further aggravates that alienated identity.
Some of the women state very clearly that their experience with Islamophobia is their self-identified reason for their radicalization. While describing her childhood, Tania Georgelas stated, “...I was from a Bangladeshi background, Bengali parents who migrated to the UK in the sixties. I was culturally Muslim, but not a practicing Muslim until 2001.” In another interview Georgelas describes how her ethnic and religious background affected her, stating “Growing up in London was rough, I came from a very poor family. We were second generation immigrants and had faced a lot of racism. We had bad neighbors, they would smash our windows.” Muslims in general are often ostracized from Western society which can cause them to crave a sense of belonging and for Muslim women specifically, crave a ’sisterhood’ (Perešin 2018, 34-35). This is an example of alienation due to Islamophobia because when she is talking about the racism she faced growing up it is in response to why she joined ISIS. When asked when her perceptions began to become more extremist, Georgelas states “9/11, it was a huge turning point in my life. It made me aware of political Islam versus Western politics.” Georgelas also mentions that
“I resonated with Bin Laden's call to arms, it was about retaliation, and why the reasons, all the reasons, so many reasons, why the Muslim community has to become united and independently strong and fight back. So, we, we saw it as a battle. We, we perceived non-Muslims as, they're enemies.”
This part of Georgelas’s recount shows a clear relationship between the Islamophobic encounters she experienced and how they developed her extremist ideas This is a mention of alienation due to Islamophobia because it shows how due to the racism Georgelas faced, she developed feelings of the Western world versus Muslims and Islam in general.
However, Georgelas also mentions that “The social circle that I surrounded myself with and the environment had very conservative Muslim values, and if you didn't comply, you would be judged, negatively, and teased or rejected or shunned.” Here, Georgelas speaks in more personal terms rather than ideological. This is quite interesting when paired with her earlier ideological focused statements regarding Islamophobia and her radicalization. What does this mean when it comes to alienation due to Islamophobia? Well, it further shows that the manifestations and effects of Islamophobia can be wildly different from case to case.
As I explained before, alienation due to Islamophobia is a unique process of alienation because the women can already face alienation before they experience Islamophobia, which causes them to become more alienated. Recruiters for Islamist extremist groups and Muslims with extremist values/beliefs can use this to target women to join Islamist extremist groups, like ISIS. They understand that these women are already alienated due to their identity as Muslims and use Islamophobia to their advantage. Often, recruiters push Islamophobic rhetoric on these women in hopes that they become more alienated from society and have nowhere to turn to but Islamist extremist groups. This can be seen when Tareena Shakil says that “...through the grooming process we were always told that, you know, if you die in England you're going to go to hell, and you need to make Hijra, Hijra is Islamic migration. So that was more of the appeal, of making Islamic migration…” In another interview Shakil also says that “... they (ISIS recruiters) would say to me, you need to make Hijra, Hijra is Islamic migration and kind of led you to believe that you have to go and live there, otherwise you'll go to hell if you stay in a country that's not a Muslim country.” The use of ’Hijra’ by recruiters highlights their strategic recruiting campaign that targets Muslim women who may lack a sense of belonging in Western society (Perešin 2018, 35). Both statements from Shakil showcase how recruiters play into the Islamophobic tendencies of Western countries to make Muslim women who are living there believe that they need to join Islamist extremist groups to be a good Muslim.
Shamima Begum was 15 years old when she left the UK to join ISIS. When asked about why she joined ISIS, she states that,
“I thought it was an Islamic community that I was joining, and at the time I had just recently started becoming very religious, I was being fed, a lot of information on the internet by people in ISIS telling me that I need to, I need to come because I can't be a good Muslim in the UK, and that my family will only drag me down with them.”
Shamima Begum goes on to say that,
“...I just slowly started becoming practicing, you know and it opened a doorway to like new people and a new life that I thought I wanted, and I thought I could fit into, you know, and I, I didn't fit into my community or my family, so I felt like I was going somewhere where I could, you know, be accepted more for who I was.”
ISIS recruiters simultaneously alienated Shamima Begum by using Islamophobic rhetoric to threaten that she could never fit in as a Muslim in the United Kingdom while also offering the perception that ISIS would be an Islamic community that would offer her a new life. At 20 years old Hoda Muthana left the U.S. to ISIS. Muthana also experienced a subset of alienation due to Islamophobia similar to Shamima Begum and Tareena Shakil. When asked about her childhood she stated that, “I had a good relationship with my family, but I wanted a more Americanized life. I just wanted to go out. I wanted to have like, friends, go to places. They (referring to family) didn't get any of that. The only way out for me was just to become practicing.”
Muthana goes on to talk about what the recruiters in an online twitter group made her think, stating “... I heard that the Hallel was announced, I thought it was obligatory upon me to go.” It is unclear how strict her family was, but it is clear they did play a part in her developing extremist beliefs. Muthana says that they only way for her to survive was to become more practicing as a Muslim and then in turn that she became under the assumption that travelling to Syria was obligatory. It’s unknown exactly what the recruiters were saying that would make her think that travelling to Syria is obligatory.
After analyzing the mentions of alienation due to Islamophobia the evidence shows that women whose lives are affected by alienation due to Islamophobia have the potential to be radicalized to join Islamist extremist groups. The evidence also shows how Islamist extremist group recruiters use Islamophobic rhetoric to further alienate the women, making them more susceptible to radicalization.
I originally hypothesized that alienation due to sexism would be the process of alienation that is the most impactful in motivating and influencing young women to be radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. After analyzing the interviews, the evidence shown in Table 7, shows that this claim is not supported. The process of alienation that had the most impact in motivating and influencing the women in the interviews was alienation due to Islamophobia. Through this analysis I uncovered previously not thought of factors that impacted these women. While emotional dependency was only mentioned by Shukee Begum, I think it's important to mention. The emotional dependency that Begum had on her husband is what led her to join ISIS. This coincides with two of the risk factors I previously identified, being married and having a radical significant other. It’s also interesting to see how ISIS recruiters used Western Islamophobic tendencies to simultaneously alienate the women and then offer them safety and belonging. This is something that I didn't previously think of, and it proved to be quite impactful on multiple of the women.
While there are pieces of evidence for each process of alienation, sexism, domestic violence, and Islamophobia in the interviews with the women, it remains unclear how much each of these processes actually motivate women to join Islamist extremist groups. The evidence shows that alienation due to Islamophobia is the process that has the most potential in motivating and impacting women to join Islamist extremist groups. However, this doesn't mean that every woman who experiences Islamophobia will become alienated and radicalized. Even though there isn't enough evidence for alienation due to sexism and domestic violence, it is evident that women who join Islamist extremist groups are most definitely alienated from society, just not by the exact processes I originally hypothesized.
Regarding the relationship between the women in the interviews and the profile of what a woman who joins an Islamist extremist group looks like, some key characteristics fit, while others differ a little. The average age of the women in the interviews is 25 years old, this is younger than the profile age of 30 years old. This may be because the profile defines the age as the climax of radicalization, such as being arrested or at the time of an incident. The actual process of radicalization most likely took place long before this. The profile states that women radicalized to extremist groups will be married, but only 3 out of the 6 women in the interviews had husbands before joining ISIS. This may be skewed because 2 of 3 women who did not have a husband before joining were married within a month of joining ISIS. However, the husbands of the women who were married before joining ISIS were all radicalized, fitting the profile that women who join Islamist extremist groups will have a radical significant other. Similar to the inconclusive results of whether women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups will have experienced trauma and abuse as an adult, it is unclear how many of the women in the interviews experienced trauma and abuse as an adult and if they are being truthful. There is not enough information available to say exactly what each woman’s education level was at the time of their radicalization. However, if their average age is 25.5 years old, it could be assumed that they would have an education level of some college, college degree, some vocational school, or a vocational school degree. There was not enough information regarding the women in the interview's social stratum in their adulthood.
Conclusion:
The main question of my research aims to understand why young women join Islamist extremist groups when they are known to be sexist and violent towards women? My main claim was women whose lives are affected by processes of alienation, such as sexism, domestic violence, and for Muslim women, Islamophobia, are more likely to be radicalized to Islamist extremist groups. I hypothesized that alienation due to sexism would be the process of alienation most impactful in motivating young women to join Islamist groups. Finally, I claimed that the media that covers these women's radicalization will have language in their headlines that targets singular aspects of their alienated identities. As I went through my analysis it was very clear that my research is an exercise in theory building and less about showing a causal relationship between my variables.
Before I even looked at the interviews, I chose to create a profile on what a woman radicalized to an Islamist extremist group would look like. Through my analysis I found that a woman radicalized to an Islamist extremist group will be around the age of 30 years old at the point of climax in their radicalization, have an education level of some college/vocational school or a college/vocational school degree, married, may have experienced trauma at some point before their radicalization, may have been abused at some point in their adulthood, have a middle-class social stratum in their adulthood, and have a radical significant other.
To conclude, I found that while all the processes of alienation I identified, alienation due to sexism, domestic violence, and Islamophobia, were all mentioned by at least one of the women, there is not enough evidence to conclude that these processes of alienation were the motivators for joining Islamist extremist groups. Even alienation due to Islamophobia, which had the most mentions in the interviews, was not evident in all 6 of the women I looked at. To leave your entire life behind and join an Islamist extremist group shows clear signs of alienation, just not concretely alienation due to the processes I was looking at. This creates a continuing and interesting gap in research surrounding the motivations of why women join Islamist extremist groups. If I was able to continue researching this topic, I would want to analyze more women radicalized to Islamist extremist groups and identify a more common process of alienation among them. It also would be interesting to research how Western perceptions of Muslims and Islam impact recruiting tactics of Islamist extremist groups and how they target women online. Also, despite the tone of the interviews being critical towards the women, the women were still portrayed as victims in terms of patriarchal religious traditions. It would be interesting to look at the relationships between the stereotypes that the West puts on women who join Islamist extremist groups and the manifestations of alienation. Women clearly have more agency then previously understood and the next question to ask is why is it not reflected in research?
Not only do women continue to join Islamist extremist groups, but they are also increasingly being used tactically in such groups. The Western perception of women not being capable of violence provides a unique tactical opportunity for Islamist extremist groups to utilize women for their own benefit. Female terrorists convey the frightening messaging that terrorism is not just a phenomenon but actually all around us (Bloom 2011, 24). Despite this increase in the tactical use of women, there is still a significant gap in understanding why women join Islamist extremist groups. Without understanding why women join Islamist extremist groups the extent of their power within these groups will go unchecked and grow. If the gap of understanding why women join Islamist groups can be filled it could lead to more concrete and targeted policy regarding women and Islamist groups. Incorporating women's motivations, roles, and goals in Islamist extremist groups is necessary to increase our overall understanding about Islamist extremist groups and how to decrease their scope of power.
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